Since it is a slow week, I was thinking about variations on Rupert Sheldrake’s idea of morphic resonance, and how these might apply to an Aristotelian philosophy of nature. You recall in that philosophy, the key is that all is composed of form and prime matter (blog/Substack).
Accepting that, at least for the sake of argument, those forms have to come from somewhere, and there has to be some action (to use a somewhat neutral word) to instantiate a form. That can’t be from patterns created in some mechanistic manner from below, which only sounds like a solution until you realize you have only pushed the problem one level back, and still have to explain the forms of the stuff below.
We are told that the mundane reaction of a W- boson and an anti-neutrino produces an electron. How does the electron which emerges from this joining know to take that “shape”? The math and observation say it happens, but the form of the electron must originate from something. The math says how it happens, but not why it happens. Why not a “metamorphic”, i.e. form-bearing, field?
There has to be something accounting for the form of the electron, and indeed of the form of any thing. Field theories are used hither and yon, so it’s not crazy. And consider we have highly—or perhaps purportedly is a better word—intelligent people earnestly defending wiggling strings in large dimensional dark-matter spaces, so if you’re inclined to giggle at whacky theories, like form-yielding fields and multiverses, there is plenty of material.
Plenty of material. Multiverse. Get it? Get it?
No charge for the jokes, my friends.
Now in my search I duly came across Sheldrake’s Wokepedia page, which glows with how-dare-he indignation. My favorite was a lunatic editor of Nature, John Maddox, calling for Sheldrake’s books to be burnt. Another, and our subject at last, was the linking to the 2016 peer-reviewed paper “Why Do Irrational Beliefs Mimic Science? The Cultural Evolution of Pseudoscience” by Stefaan Blancke, Maarten Boudry and Massimo Pigliucci in Theoria. What an impressive title. They call out Sheldrake, too.
Most don’t know that in the Twentieth Century, philosophers worked hard at finding a formula to demarcate science from so-called pseudoscience. It was eventually agreed the search was futile after it was realized that each suggested criterion would exclude what is considered legitimate science. It turns out the only way to tell good from bad science is the old-fashioned technique of putting claims to the test.
Yet Pigliucci and pals think they have hit upon a New & Improved! demarcation, at least to separate Experts from non-approved sources. They exhort non-Experts to follow the five points below. As you read these, keep in mind the covid panic, “climate change”, and all the rest (my paragraphications):
Firstly, one can check the arguments that experts bring to the discussion. Lay people may not be able to grasp the arguments directly, but they can check for what Goldman calls “dialectical superiority”. This does not simply mean that one looks for the best debater – although debating skills can certainly add to the impression that one is an expert – but that one keeps track of the extent to which an alleged expert is capable of debunking or rebutting the opponent’s claims.
Secondly, a novice can check whether and to what extent other experts in that field support a given (alleged) expert’s propositions. It will be more reasonable to follow an expert’s opinion if it is in line with the consensus.
Thirdly, lay people can distinguish between experts on the basis of meta-expertise, in the form of credentials such as diplomas and work experience. For example, an expert with a PhD in a relevant field can in general be considered to be more reliable –ceteris paribus – than an amateur.
Fourthly, a novice can check for biases and interests that affect an expert’s judgement. If an expert has a stake in defending a particular position, it will raise the suspicion that he is not interested in providing correct information, which will undermine his credibility. Of course, nobody can be free of biases, which also counts for scientists. Hence, according to Pigliucci (2010, p. 296), “the question is not whether there is bias (there always is), but how much, where it comes from, and how one can become aware of and correct it.”
Fifthly, a novice can assess an expert’s past track record. The more an expert has been right in the past, the more he has demonstrated that he has indeed access to some expert domain. As such, he will probably be right again in the future
This list, in essence, was given in a discussion with Leonard Susskind recently, coming, funnily enough, in what was otherwise a criticism of the very field which he helped heap upon us.
Anyway, you will have heard versions of these tips from many sources. The list boils down to credentialism. Listen to us because we’re the guardians of The Idea under discussion. Works great when The Idea is true, or mostly true; works terrible when The Idea stinks (but touted by Experts) or is new and untested.
Scientists are raised hearing the stories of stalwart heroes of the past who stuck to their ideas, come what may. What usually come-what-may-ed was hersterical screeching and calls for book burnings. Remember the hand-washing guy? Hounded. The drifting continents fellow? Scorned. The meteor man? Loathed.
The lesson scientists think they take from this is that when it comes their turn to consider the bold new idea, they will defend the person making it, and ensure the fellow gets his due. They will stand up to their blustering colleagues and remind them the way forward is not timid surrender to Consensus and review of peers, but bold thinking!
When the real lesson of the endless supply of these stories is that many more of them are to come, and that most scientists will be part of them, almost every one of them on the wrong side. Instead of the humility that should result from these cautionary tales, scientists should understand it’s much more likely they’ll evince standard stunted stubbornness.
It was ever so; it will ever be so.
Subscribe or donate to support this site and its wholly independent host using credit card click here. Or use the paid subscription at Substack. Cash App: \$WilliamMBriggs. For Zelle, use my email: matt@wmbriggs.com, and please include yours so I know who to thank. BUY ME A COFFEE.
I was interested in Sheldrake from early in his career – and saw him give a lecture in 1984, which was indeed full of Aristotle (as I recall). I later got to know him a little as a penfriend, and he gave me useful feedback on a theory paper once.
So I have generally benign feelings towards the chap!
However, I think there is a degree of misrepresentation about what he is doing; because he is primarily a metaphysical philosopher –
https://charltonteaching.blogspot.com/2011/10/what-is-rupert-sheldrake.html
In other words; he is suggesting a new framework for science. This is why he can never convince anyone who does not want, or does not see any need for, a new framework for science.