We have shown that limited, and only limited, maximal diversity of physical characteristic is logically possible. However, three aspects make it impractical. The first is the necessity of coming to agreement with the definitions and delineations of each desirable physical trait. All experience suggests such an agreement will never happen, or will only be short lived, or must be made by government fiat. Thus, whatever diversity program is mandated—for we have seen that it cannot be left to fortune—will be seen as non-diverse by some.
The winners will naturally feel that their definition to be the only possible and that no counter argument exists. They will dismiss the losers as obtuse; the losers’ only recourse is to agitate politically for their groupings to be recognized (and this is indeed what we see). The second reason is related: not all will agree on the chosen traits, preferring others to the mandated ones (for example, most agree to ignore age in most contexts, but occasional disputes arise). The third reason is the necessity of quota masters. Once more, our knowledge of politics argues this will not be a morally pure process. Thus, while limited physical diversity is logically possible, it is nearly not possible in practice. Acrimony is guaranteed. This obviously holds whether diversity is meant to be maximal or proportional.
Now ignore all physical characteristics and concentrate solely on behavior (which we also defined as including mental processes). We still need the idea of scope, because human behavior on the planet as a whole approaches something like diversity (the explanation of “something like” is still to come). We want to stock people within each scope such that diversity of behavior is maximized. Let’s stay with our example of the professoriate at Behemoth U.
To be maximally (or even proportionally) diverse, these professors should purposely include rapists, pedophiles, murderers, cutthroats, the suicidal, serial killers, the maniacal, thieves, the abusive, those who don’t deign to or cannot teach, the inept, those practicing human sacrifice, psychopaths, liars, cannibals, torturers, and Marxists. If you choke on even one of these, and the myriads more similar behaviors, you are being judgmental and admitting that maximal diversity of behavior is not desirable. And you cannot allow for chance to bring these behaviors to the fore: you must select for them. Because, of course, chance might not stock your scope with the proper number of rapists.
You may think the point just made is obvious or silly. It is anything but. Chances are that you have never considered what range of behaviors you consider acceptable, thinking your definitions were “obvious” and agreed to by all. That view is so absurd that it isn’t even false. To take just one example, consider cannibalism, which some cultures have (and do) consider proper behavior. Are you multicultural enough to tolerate cannibals on campus? Is moral relativism important enough to you that you would allow General Butt Naked (a real name) and his gang of Liberians to sacrifice children to the gods and then eat their bodies? Would you allow the stoning of homosexuals in the name of inclusivity? Should the women in the classrooms of some professors be forced to undergo clitorectomies in the name of diversity? Should we adopt Sharia law?
Funnily enough, those who most loudly plead for moral relativism are those who also claim that there are universal “human rights”. I do not say the later claim is wrong, but it is inconsistent with moral relativism.
Again I say that if you dismiss these questions as absurd, then you are making a logical mistake or at least being petulant. If you, in any way, delineate a set of behaviors which are anathema, this implies that you are also defining a set of behaviors which are desirable or at least allowable. And once you do so, you admit that diversity of behavior is undesirable, that unconstrained multiculturalism is ridiculous, and that strict moral relativism is absurd. Notice that I leave aside all technicalities of what a “culture” is, how many people have to tolerate or encourage a behavior to make it “cultural”, and so forth—any definitions here will of course also be arbitrary and not universally agreed to.
Now, even if you are a strict moral relativist, even if you think it is fine to tolerate Nazis, say, we still have the problem that diversity of behavior is not possible unless we define, in advance, groupings of behaviors we deem worthy of tracking. Otherwise, there are too many behaviors and too few scopes: no scope will ever be able to boast of containing practitioners of every behavior, even proportionally. Universal maximal diversity of behavior is thus impossible, even if were desirable, which it clearly is not.
Limited diversity of behavior might be possible, however. Again, the dimensions of behavior must be made explicit and must be agreed to by all. Neither condition is likely to be fulfilled in practice, but in theory they might be. Clearly, political viewpoints are not one of the behaviors in which diversity is sought. Language use, for example, is also vexed by inconsistent opinions on diversity. And just saying “religion” ought to shiver your timbers.