Short (edited) chapter this week. Busy busy busy. Note the items on free will at the end.
 AFTER discussing the matters concerning the knowledge of the divine intellect it remains for us to consider the divine will.
 For from the fact that there is intelligence in God it follows that in Him there is will. Because, since the good understood is the proper object of the will, it follows that the good understood, as such, is willed. Now understood indicates a reference to one who understands. It follows therefore of necessity that one who understands good, as such, has a will. Now God understands good: for since He is perfectly intelligent, as shown above, He understands being simultaneously with the notion of good. Therefore in Him there is will…
Notes The opposites are also true. The evil is also willed. It also follows that one who understands evil also has a will.
 Further. A form considered by the intellect neither moves nor causes anything except through the medium of the will, whose object is an end and a good by which one is moved to act. Wherefore the speculative intellect does not move; nor does the sole imagination without the estimative power. Now the form of the divine intellect is the cause of being and movement in other things, for God moves things by His intellect, as we shall prove further on. Therefore it follows that He has a will.
Notes This is one of those things that should be kept in the back of your mind. We’ll return to it many weeks hence.
 Again. The first of motive powers in intelligent beings is the will: because the will applies every power to its act: for we understand because we will, we imagine because we will, and so forth. And the will has this because its object is the end–although the intellect, not by way of efficient and moving cause, but by way of final cause, moves the will, by putting its object before it, which object is the end. Therefore it is especially fitting that the first mover should have a will.
 Further. The free is that which is its own cause: and so the free has the aspect of that which is of itself. Now liberty of action is seated primarily in the will, for in so far as one acts voluntarily, one is said to perform any action whatever freely. Therefore it is especially fitting that the first agent should act by will, since to Him it is most competent to act of Himself.
Notes A perennial topic. We all (as in all) observe that we have free will, which is sufficient proof that we do. Further, we would never use and understand (as that word is used above) the words we, I, me, and so forth. So what causes our will? For everything that changes must have an impetus. Our will itself, as St Thomas says, “by way of final cause, by putting its object before it, which object is the end.” Now, failing to understand this mechanism (as it were) does not mean that therefore we don’t have free will. This would be like a child saying a car doesn’t run because he doesn’t understand how an internal combustion engine works.
 Chs. xliv., xlv.
 Chs. xliv., xlv.
 Bk. II., ch. xxiv.
 1 Metaph. ii. 9.
 Cf. 2 Phys. vii. 3.
 Ch. xlii.