Saint Wiki is back! But in case it disappears again, I’ll keep running links to both our translations.
 IT may be shown from the above that God is an intelligent being.
… Moreover. In no order of movers do we find that a mover by the intellect is the instrument of that which moves without intellect; but rather the opposite. Now all movers that are in the world, are compared to the first mover which is God, as instruments to the principal agent. Since then we find in the world many movers by intellect, it is impossible that the first mover move without intellect. Therefore God must of necessity be intelligent.
Notes Did you notice we return to Chapter 13 more than any other? Review, review, review. If, as is true, God is (ever) the first mover, then He must be intelligent, because why? Because randomness certainly cannot be intelligent and causal (think about it).
 Again. A thing is intelligent from the fact of its being without matter: in sign of which forms become understood by being abstracted from matter. Hence also understanding is of universals and not of singulars, because matter is the principle of individualization. Now forms actually understood become one with the intellect actually understanding. Wherefore, if forms are actually understood from the very fact that they are without matter, it follows that a thing is actually intelligent from the fact that it is without matter. Now it was shown above that God is absolutely immaterial. Therefore He is intelligent.
Note Not only God’s, but our intellects are also immaterial. We are not our brains. See this review of Feser’s The Last Superstition for more detail.
Consider first that when we grasp the nature, essence, or form of a thing, it is necessarily one and the same form, nature, or essence that exists both in the thing and in the intellect. The form of triangularity that exists in our minds when we think about triangles is the same form that exists in actual triangles themselves; the form of “dogness” that exists in our minds when we think about dogs is the same form that exists in actual dogs; and so forth. If this weren’t the case, then we just wouldn’t really be thinking about triangles, dogs, and the like, since to think about these things requires grasping what they are, and what they are is determined by their essence or form. But now suppose that the intellect is a material thing—some part of the brain, or whatever. Then for the form to exist in the intellect is for the form to exist in a certain material thing. But for a form to exist in a material thing is just for that material thing to be the kind of thing the form is a form of; for example, for the form of “dogness” to exist in a certain parcel of matter is just for that parcel of matter to be a dog. And in that case, if your intellect was just the same thing as some part of your brain, it follows that that part of your brain would become a dog whenever you thought about dogs. “But that’s absurd!” you say. Of course it is; that’s the point. Assuming that the intellect is material leads to such absurdity; hence the intellect is not material.
… Moreover. Whatever tends definitely to an end, either prescribes that end to itself, or that end is prescribed to it by another: else it would not tend to this end rather than to that. Now natural things tend to definite ends, for they do not pursue their natural purposes by chance, since in that case those purposes would not be realized always or for the most part, but seldom, for of such is chance. Since then they do not prescribe the end to themselves, for they do not apprehend the notion of end, it follows that the end is prescribed to them by another, Who is the author of nature. This is He Who gives being to all, and Who necessarily exists of Himself, Whom we call God, as shown above. Now He would be unable to prescribe nature its end unless He were intelligent. Therefore God is intelligent…
Notes The acorn doesn’t know it’s heading towards and oak: it is merely fulfilling its genetic plan. If conditions are right. If they are not, then the acorn does not reach its end. Now we know that acorns become oaks and not Buicks or octopuses. If there was no regularity, there’d not only be no oaks, there’d be no us, thus there’d be no arguments on whether teleology was real.
It’s not only acorns that move toward ends but photons in double-slit experiments, too. Those photons don’t become kumquats or icicles, but move in regular, predictable patterns—as if they had an end, which they do. Slide from acorns to photons to whatever is smaller or more basic. It will be the same story. Ends are being met. And those ends could not be caused by “chance”, which cannot be a cause. At base, there must be a first mover, first cause, that designs the ends which are met. There is no other way to produce regularity. The “laws” which govern the universe (all there is) must come from an intelligence; they cannot come from nothing or “blind chance”, which isn’t a power.
So we’re right back at Chapter 13 again. Plus, it doesn’t seem likely that most people would argue God is not intelligent (though they do incorrectly argue He doesn’t exist).
 Ch. xiii.
 Chs. xvii., xx., xxvii.
 Ch. xxviii.
 Ch. xxxi.
 3 De Anima viii. 1.
 Ch. xiii.
 Ps. cxxxviii. 6.