Another small chapter showing the meticulousness of our saintly guide. Next week is some really juicy material: How God is said to be unable to do some things.
 FROM the foregoing it is clear that God produces His effects according to His wisdom.
 For the will is moved to act by some kind of apprehension: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. Now God is a voluntary agent, as we have proved. Since, then, in God there is none but intellectual apprehension, and since He understands nothing except by understanding Himself, to understand Whom is to be wise, it follows that God works according to His wisdom.
Notes In modern English, apprehension is a term indicating nervousness, uncertainty, but in older usage (as here) it means to grasp, to understand, which is to say, it is an act of intellection. The word has, in effect, turned into its opposite. Not unlike many things, eh, dear reader?
 Again. Every agent produces its like. Hence it follows that every agent works by that according to which it bears a likeness to its effect: thus fire heats according to the mode of its heat. Now in every voluntary agent, as such, the likeness to his effect is in respect of the apprehension of his intellect: for if the likeness to his effect were in a voluntary agent according only to the disposition of his nature, he would only produce one effect, since the natural reason of one is only one. Therefore every voluntary agent produces an effect according to the reason of his intellect. Now God works by His will, as already proved. Therefore He brings things into being by the wisdom of His intellect.
Notes This is, like the majority of arguments in philosophy, a proof of the existence of an ability and not a demonstration of how the ability works. The same sorts of things are common in mathematics—existence versus constructive proofs—and these provoke no misunderstandings. But in our day, where people are only familiar with physics, the assumption that metaphysics must be exactly like physics often produces incomprehension and, in cases of scientism, incredulity.
 Moreover. According to the Philosopher (1 Metaph.) it belongs to a wise man to set things in order: because the ordering of things cannot be done except by the knowledge of the things ordered as to their relation and proportion both to one another and to something higher which is their end: since the mutual order of certain things is on account of their order to the end.
Now knowledge of the mutual relations and proportions of certain things belongs only to one who has an intellect; while it belongs to wisdom to judge of certain things by the highest cause. Wherefore it follows that all ordering is done by the wisdom of an intelligent being. Thus in mechanics those who direct the order of buildings are called the wise men of the building craft. Now the things produced by God have a mutual order which is not casual, as it is the same always or for the most part. Hence it is evident that God brought things into being by ordering them. Therefore God brought things into being by His wisdom.
Notes Next time somebody asks you about wisdom, quote them this: it belongs to wisdom to judge of certain things by the highest cause. And then ask yourself whether it is a coincidence that modern metaphysics tosses teleology.
 Further. Things that proceed from the will are either things that may be done, such as acts of virtue, which are the perfections of the doer: or they pass into outward matter and are things that can be made.
Wherefore it is clear that created things proceed from God as made. Now the reason about things to be made is art, as the Philosopher says. Therefore all created things are compared to God as products of art to the craftsman. But the craftsman brings his handiwork into being by the ordering of his wisdom and intellect. Therefore God also made all creatures by the ordering of His intellect.
Notes And so does it follow, dear reader, that since the abandonment of the end the state of art is no longer state of the art?