William M. Briggs

Statistician to the Stars!

Page 4 of 751

Two Common Statistical Fallacies

Here are two fun fallacies, excerpted from a paper I wrote a couple of years ago in the Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons. For more on this sort of thing, buy this book before they run out: Uncertainty: The Soul of Modeling, Probability & Statistics.

The Everyone Else Said It Was True Fallacy

“Radon is one of the most serious environmental health risks that we face,” said Univeristy of Minnesota professor Bill Angell. He explains that the colorless, odorless radioactive gas forms naturally in the ground, but when it enters your home, it is a serious problem.

“The risk of dying of lung cancer because of radon in your home is one out of 50,” said Angell, “So it’s an incredibly big risk.”

Angell’s comments were based on published studies such as a Danish cohort study by Bräuner et al., whose abstract read: “We find a positive association between radon and lung cancer risk consistent with previous studies…. [T]he results of the present prospective cohort study are fully compatible with an association between residential radon and risk for lung cancer as detected in three previous meta analyses and provide important evidence at the low end of the low end of the residential dose curve.”

In that study, the authors measured actual exposure and outcomes of about 57,000 Danes and found the “adjusted [risk] for lung cancer was 1.04 (95% CI: 0.69–1.56) in association with a 100 Bq/m^3 higher radon concentration and 1.67 (95% CI: 0.69–4.04) among non-smokers.” Since the confidence intervals include 1, the classical interpretation is that radon is therefore not significantly associated with lung cancer. In fact, the authors said as much: “The role of chance cannot be excluded as these associations were not statistically significant.”

The finding of no effect was contrary to expectations, so the authors said, “In the present study, a number of risk factors for lung cancer were less prevalent among participants living at the higher radon concentrations, including…low fruit intake, risk occupation and traffic-related air pollution. This would result in an underestimation of the association between radon and lung cancer risk in our study.”

These words were necessary to suggest that radon might still cause lung cancer even in the face of great evidence it did not. The authors felt that something had to explain the non-effect, because they were unwilling to conceive that radon (at the stated levels) might be harmless to lungs. So in their explanation they discarded the massive evidence they collected and surmised that radon was just as deadly as commonly thought.

The Everyone Else Said it Was True Fallacy is: Even though your results are the exact opposite of your belief, explain them away, then state your belief.

The Statistics Aren’t What You Think They Are Fallacy

Here are two headlines from The Daily Mail, the popular English newspaper. “Bad news for chocoholics: Dark chocolate isn’t so healthy for you after all,” from a Jan 24, 2012, article explaining that chocolate doesn’t do much for the heart. Then just three months later, on Apr 24, another headline claimed: “Eating dark chocolate is good for your heart.” Both headlines drew on different peer-reviewed medical studies that concluded, using p-values as evidentiary markers, that chocolate was and wasn’t good for hearts.

Two more headlines from this newspaper read: “Ignore all that hype about antioxidant supplements: Why daily vitamin pills can INCREASE your risk of disease” (May 21, 2012), and “The vitamin pills that actually work! How some supplements can work wonders for certain ailments” (May 27). Some of the ailments were the same in both stories. These were also based on peer-reviewed studies, using p-values to “prove” their contentions.

On Apr 11, 2011, a headline announced: “Women who drink four cups of coffee a day face higher risk of incontinence.” Then from Thomson-Reuters, (the Daily Mail did not cover the follow-up study) a year later, on Apr 27, 2012, readers were told: “Caffeine not tied to worsening urinary incontinence.” The underlying story was the same.

On Jul 29, 2004, a headline on OBGYN.net read: “Pomegranates shown to be effective for menopausal symptoms.” It took eight years for the Daily Mail to report on Jan 24, 2012, that: “Pomegranate seed oil ‘no better than a placebo’ at easing hot flashes,” (a menopausal symptom). Both reports were based on peer-reviewed studies that used p-values as evidence.

The Statistics Aren’t What You Think They Are Fallacy is also known as the P-values Aren’t Proof Fallacy. Researchers want to know the probability that some theory is true given the evidence they have collected. This theory is then often used in developing medical practice guidelines, particularly when the theory fits expectations.

But p-values, the measures upon which most studies rely, and which everybody, even those who know better, take as proof of a theory when the p-values are less than the magic value of 0.05, do not give evidence that any theory is true. 8 Indeed, the actual definition of a p-value is so complicated nobody ever remembers it; all that is recalled is that p-values should be small.

Stream: March For Science Descending Into Farce

Nye demonstrates how to protect yourself against global warming heat rays.

Apologies for the re-send. Certain events intervened and I posted the original too early. The Stream article is now live.

March For Science Descending Into Farce: Intersectionality and Diversity edition.

Last thing the March for Science needs, say some agitated folks, is Bill Nye, the errorproneScience Guy” co-leading the parade. Why?

See, Nye is white. And a man. And some organizers are concerned that onlookers will notice Nye is white, and a man, and project his male-whiteness onto Science itself. That in turn will cause the gullible to figure Science is mostly done by white men.

Which, historically and in many current fields, it was and is. Now this fact is for good or for bad, but it is a fact. And it’s not likely those who say they are “for” Science and “Reason” would be pleased were the contributions from white men removed from Science. So long, Calculus!

Or maybe they would be. Because it seems organizers believe scientific results are less important than who is producing them. Diversity trumps Science.

Proof? Buzzfeed reports that, so far, the March for Science has already gone through “four diversity statements“. And for instance the Twitter account @ScienceMarchDC tweeted (and later deleted) “colonization, racism, immigration, native rights, sexism, abelism, queer-, trans-, intersex-phobia, & econ justice are scientific issues.” The tweet also pictured a black power fist and rainbow flag icons.

Actually, of course, Science is silent on all these matters. But that’s because Science is mute on every moral and ethical question put to it. Including the question whether to deign to include a white man holding a Science baton.

[…]

The March organizers want us to know what they stand for (emphasis original).

[…]

Sound like politics to you, and not Science? That was the effect they were going for. Organizers insist “It was a mistake to ever imply that the March for Science is apolitical — while this march is explicitly non-partisan, it is political” (the original statement was in bold type).

Yet the positions taken by the politicians, activists, and many others involved in the March are, as is obvious, explicitly partisan. Insistence on Diversity, by which it is always meant rigorous, mandatory
and monitored balance between people from favored political groups, is not a scientific concept. It is pure politics. And anti-scientific politics, at that.

There is zero evidence, for example, that men and woman are equally competent research mathematicians. Marchers call this a “disparity”. The rest of us call it a banal consequence of Nature. Yet Marchers insist on the theory of Equality, which says that men and women are innately equal in all abilities.

When theory is more important than observation, we are in the realm of politics. And we observe, for instance, throughout all of history and in all circumstances an enormous preponderance of men occupying the top seats of mathematics. The theory of Equality (when applied to mathematical ability) is therefore almost certainly false. The observation has thus quashed the theory. When observation is allowed to rule over theory, we are in the realm of Science.

[…]

March on over to see the rest.

Summary Against Modern Thought: The immortality of the soul, Part II

This may be proved in three ways. The first...

This may be proved in three ways. The first…

See the first post in this series for an explanation and guide of our tour of Summa Contra Gentiles. All posts are under the category SAMT.

Previous post.

We’re finishing the immortality of the soul. This week counter-arguments are refuted. See paragraph 4 for a surprising argument for the finiteness of the universe!

Chapter 80 Arguments to prove that the corruption of the body entails that of the soul [And their solution] (alternate translation) We’re still using the alternate translation.

This material also incorporates Chapter 81.

1 There are certain arguments which would seem to prove the impossibility of human souls remaining after the body.

2 For, if human souls are multiplied in accordance with the multiplication of bodies, as was shown above, then the souls cannot remain in their multiple being when the bodies are destroyed. One of two alternatives, therefore, follows ineluctably: either the human soul perishes utterly, or only one soul remains. And, seemingly, this state of affairs would accord with the theory of those who maintain that what is one in all men is alone incorruptible, whether this be the agent intellect only, as Alexander declares, or, in the Averroistic doctrine, the possible along with the agent intellect.

3 Moreover, the formal principle [ratio] is the cause of specific diversity. But, if many souls remain after the corruption of bodies, they must be mutually diverse; for just as there is identity where there is unity of substance, so those things we diverse which are substantially many.

Now, in souls that survive the death of the bodies which they inform, the only possible diversity is of a formal character, since such souls are not composed of matter and form–a point proved above with respect to every intellectual substance. It therefore follows that those souls are specifically diverse.

Nevertheless, souls are not changed to another species as a result of the body’s corruption, because whatever is changed from species to species is corrupted. Consequently, even before souls were separated from their bodies, they were specifically diverse. Now, composite things owe their specific nature to their form. It follows that individual men will be specifically diverse—an awkward consequence. It is, therefore, seemingly impossible that a multiplicity of human souls should survive their bodies.

Notes Not only are souls not made of matter, but a hidden implication is that your soul survives even if you don’t want it to.

4 Then, too, for those who espouse the doctrine of the eternity of the world it would seem utterly impossible to maintain that a multiplicity of human souls remain after the death of the body. For, if the world exists from eternity, then movement did, too, so that generation likewise is eternal.

But in that case an infinite number of men have died before us. If, then, the souls of the dead remain in their multiple being after death, it must be said that there actually exist now an infinite number of souls of men already dead. This, however, is impossible, because the actually infinite cannot exist in nature. Hence it follows, on the hypothesis of the world’s eternity, that souls do not remain many after death.

Notes Isn’t that a sweet—and unexpected!—argument for the finiteness of the universe. The next is a terrific argument about modern conceptions of the “mind”.

5 Also, “That which comes to a thing and departs from it, without the latter being corrupted, accrues to it accidentally”; for this is the definition of an accident. Thus, if the soul is not corrupted as the result of its severance from the body, it would follow that the soul is united to the body accidentally, and, further, that man is an accidental being, composed of body and soul. In that case, too, we should be faced with the consequence that there is no human species, for one species does not result from things joined together by accident; white man, for example, is not a species.

6 A completely inoperative substance, moreover, cannot possibly exist. All psychic operation, however, is corporeally determined, as we see by induction. For the soul’s nutritive powers function through the bodily qualities, and by a bodily instrument acting upon the body, which is perfected by the soul, which is nourished and increased, and from which the seed is separated for generative purposes.

Secondly, all the operations of the powers belonging to the sensitive soul are executed through bodily organs, some of them entailing a certain bodily transmutation, as in those which are called passions of the soul, for instance, love, joy, and the like. And again, while understanding is not an operation carried out through any bodily organ, nevertheless its objects are the phantasms, which stand in relation to it as colors to the power of sight; so that, just as sight cannot function in the absence of colors, so the intellective soul is incapable of understanding without phantasms.

Moreover, to enable it to understand, the soul needs the powers which prepare the phantasms so as to render them actually intelligible, namely, the cogitative power and the memory-powers which, being acts of certain bodily organs and functioning through them, surely cannot remain after the body perishes.

And that is why Aristotle says that the soul never understands without a phantasm, and that it understands nothing without the passive intellect, which he terms the cogitative power, and which is destructible. This explains why he says in De anima I [4] that man’s understanding is corrupted through the decay of some inward part, namely, the phantasm, or the passive intellect. Aristotle also remarks in De anima III [5] that after death we do not remember what we know in life. Evidently, then, no operation of the soul can remain after death. Therefore, neither does its substance continue to be, since no substance can exist without operation.

Notes I hope you didn’t miss “the intellective soul is incapable of understanding without phantasms” et cetera. Again, you miss all shots are improving your soul after you die. Confessionals are usually open before most masses.

7 [This begins Chap. 81] Now, because these arguments arrive at a false conclusion, as was shown above, we must endeavor to solve them…

9 For some advocates of the eternity of the world the third argument cited above has been the occasion of their lapsing into various bizarre opinions.

For some admitted the conclusion unqualifiedly, declaring that human souls perish utterly with their bodies. Others said that of all souls there remains a single separate entity common to them all, namely, the agent intellect, according to some, or, in addition, the possible intellect, according to others.

Still others maintained that souls continue to exist in their multiplicity after the death of the bodies; yet, on pain of having to admit an infinite number of souls, these persons averred that the same souls are united to different bodies after a certain period of time has elapsed. This was the Platonists’ theory, of which we shall treat further on.

Avoiding all these inferences, another group of thinkers held that it is not impossible for separate souls to be actually infinite in number. For in the case of things devoid of mutual order, to be actually infinite is to be infinite accidentally, and those thinkers saw no incongruity in admitting this. Such is the position of Avicenna and Al-Ghazali.

Aristotle does not tell us explicitly which of these opinions he himself shared, but he does expressly affirm the eternity of the world. Nevertheless, of all the opinions cited above, the last one is not inconsistent with the principle laid down by him. For in Physics III [5] and in De caelo I [5] he proves that there is no actual infinity in natural bodies, but he does not prove that there is no actual infinity in immaterial substances.

In any case it is certain that this question presents no difficulty to those who profess the Catholic faith, and do not posit the eternity of the world.

Notes No reincarnation! And nothing actually infinite, except God. But never forget how big infinity is!

10 Moreover, if the soul remains in existence after the death of the body, it does not follow that it must have been accidentally united to it, as the fourth argument concluded. For an accident is described as that which can be present or absent without the corruption of the subject composed of matter and form.

However, if this statement is applied to the principles of the composite subject, it is found to be false; because it is clear, as Aristotle shows in Physics I [9], that prime matter is ungenerated and incorruptible. That is why prime matter remains in its essence when the form departs.

Nevertheless, the form was united to it not accidentally but essentially, since it was joined to it according to one act of being.

The soul likewise is united to the body as regards one act of being, as was shown above. Therefore, although the soul continues to exist after the body has passed away, it is nevertheless united to the body substantially and not accidentally. Now, prime matter does not remain in act after the form’s departure, except in relation to the act of another form, whereas the human soul remains in the same act; and the reason for this is that the human soul is a form and an act, while prime matter is a being only potentially.

11 The proposition advanced in the fifth argument, namely, that no operation can remain in the soul when separated from the body, we declare to be false, in view of the fact that those operations do remain which are not exercised through organs. Such are the operations of understanding and willing. Those operations, however, do not endure which are carried out by means of bodily organs, and of such a kind are the operations of the nutritive and sensitive powers.

Notes But what about what was said above about losing the chance of further perfection? Of the kind of perfection in effecting your salvation, it cannot. But it can still “operate”. See the next argument, and paragraph 15.

12 Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that the soul understands in a different manner when separated from the body and when united to it, even as it exists diversely in those cases; for a thing acts according as it is.

Indeed, although the soul, while united to the body, enjoys an absolute being not depending on the body, nevertheless the body is the soul’s housing, so to speak, and the subject that receives it. This explains why the soul’s proper operation, understanding, has its object, namely, the phantasm, in the body, despite the fact that this operation does not depend on the body as though it were effected through the instrumentality of a bodily organ.

It follows that, so long as the soul is in the body, it cannot perform that act without a phantasm; neither can it remember except through the powers of cogitation and memory, by which the phantasms are prepared, as stated above.

Accordingly, understanding, so far as this mode of it is concerned, as well as remembering, perishes with the death of the body.

The separated soul, however, exists by itself, apart from the body. Consequently, its operation, which is understanding, will not be fulfilled in relation to those objects existing in bodily organs which the phantasms are; on the contrary, it will understand through itself, in the manner of substances which in their being are totally separate from bodies, and of which we shall treat subsequently.

And from those substances, as from things above it, the separated soul will be able to receive a more abundant influx, productive of a more perfect understanding on its own part. There is an indication of this event in the young. For the more the soul is freed from preoccupation with its body, the more fit does it become for understanding higher things.

Hence, the virtue of temperance, which withdraws the soul from bodily pleasures, is especially fruitful in making men apt in understanding. Then, too, sleeping persons, their bodily senses being dormant, with no disturbance of the humours or vapors to impede their mental processes, are, under the influence of higher beings, enabled to perceive some things pertaining to the future which transcend the scope of human reason.

And this is all the more true of those in a fainting condition or in ecstasy, since such states involve an even greater withdrawal from the bodily senses. Nor does this come to pass undeservedly. For, since the human soul, as we have shown already, is situated on the boundary line between corporeal and incorporeal substances, as though it existed on the horizon of eternity and time, it approaches to the highest by withdrawing from the lowest. Consequently, when the soul shall be completely separated from the body, it will be perfectly likened to separate substances in its mode of understanding, and will receive their influx abundantly.

13 Therefore, although the mode of understanding vouchsafed to us in the present life ceases upon the death of the body, nevertheless another and higher mode of understanding will take its place.

14 Now, recollection, being an act performed through a bodily organ, as Aristotle shows in the De memoria [I], cannot remain in the soul after the body, unless recollection be taken equivocally for the understanding of things which one knew before. For there must be present in the separate soul even the things that it knew in this life, since the intelligible species are received into the possible intellect inexpugnably, as we have already shown.

15 As for the other operations of the soul, such as loving, rejoicing, and the like, one must beware of equivocation.

For sometimes such operations are taken inasmuch as they are passions of the soul, and in this sense they are acts of the sensible appetite appertaining to the concupiscible and irascible powers, entailing some bodily change. And thus they cannot remain in the soul after death, as Aristotle proves in the De anima [I, 4].

Sometimes, however, such operations are taken for a simple act of the will, in the absence of all passion. That is why Aristotle says in Book VII of the Ethics that God rejoices in a single and simple operation; and in Book X that in the contemplation of wisdom there is marvelous delight; and in Book VII he distinguishes the love of friendship from the love that is a passion.

Now, since the will is a power employing no organ, as neither does the intellect, it is plain that these things of which we are speaking remain in the separated soul, so far as they are acts of the will.

Going In Style—To The Movies

This post originally appeared 17 January of this year, but is reposted now because the remake was released yesterday. We’d be interested in hearing from any who see it.

I once had the idea of doing a weekly movie review. This would have been unlike standard reviews, because I would not write about the movies in question. I would start with the name and premise of the new movie, but then let myself become distracted by the larger theme. The subtle and comedic idea (these words are relative) would be that the movie must be so bad it wasn’t worth seeing.

But I couldn’t bring myself to it, because the idea required me to pay attention to new movies. After one or two failed attempts, the realization that most new movies were worse than I had imagined discouraged me.

I was reminded of this when I saw the trailer for the remake of Going In Style. If one had to use one word to describe it, that word would be awful. But it was awful in an instructive way.

The original (spoiler alert!) had George Burns at his magnificent best, Art Carney underplaying with intent, and Lee Strasberg looking like he never could have been young. The trio share a (real!) apartment in Astoria, Queens. Except for Carney, they are without family. They spend the endless summers sitting on a park bench waiting for the inevitable. The highlights of the day see Carney crossing his leg to find ease and brushing a speck of dust from his jacket.

Burns, for the sole reason of excitement and the realization that if they were caught their lives could not worsen, proposes robbing a bank. Strasberg warns that they could get shot. Burns answers, “What’s the difference?”, and Carney somewhat exasperated echoes, “Yeah, Willie. What’s the difference?”

After a brief reconnoitre in the city (all New Yorkers call lower Manhattan “The city”) and the purchase of Groucho-glasses for disguise, the sounding furrows are smited and the robbery, which is somewhat sloppy, occurs. The men come alive again. Strasberg sheds forty years; he even giggles.

But the next day, after hiding their moderate haul (about thirty-five thousand) with Carney’s nephew (who knows nothing of the heist), Strasberg dies of a heart attack sitting on that same park bench. Burns and Carney agree to pretend Strasberg left a twenty-five thousand life insurance policy and to give it to Carney’s nephew, who with his family, including an adorable little girl who acts as real little girls act and who is only on screen for a few minutes, is struggling.

On a lark, Burns and Carney head to Vegas, to live it up just once more. They hit a lucky streak, winning more than double what they stole. Worried they might themselves be robbed, they head back to New York on a late night flight. Back in their apartment, Carney, exhausted, goes to sleep. Burns dozes in a chair, but awakens early to hear on the radio the police are closing in on the daring bank robbers. Burns tries to wake Carney, but he has passed away in the night.

Burns brings the Vegas winnings to Carney’s nephew and takes him into his confidence, telling him of his uncle’s death. Burns returns home and in the movie’s most poignant moment, takes down some old photographs, which include one of his real-life wife Gracie Allen who was then deceased. Brought to tears over the memories, Burns becomes incontinent. While in the bathroom to clean himself, he realizes he has become in old age what he was in young age.

As Burns prepares for the funeral next morning, he is arrested. He admits the robbery, but claims to have buried the money and refuses to say where.

The closing scene has Carney’s nephew visiting Burns in prison, advising him that things would be easier if he were to return the loot. Burns refuses, knowing life outside could not be worse than inside. As the guard escorts him away, Burns tells the nephew not to worry, tips him a wink and says, “Besides, no tinhorn joint like this could ever hold me.” The screen fades as Burns walks beyond the sunset.

My description has not done the movie justice; it would be better to watch it yourself. Do so before watching the trailer for the remake.

The remake has done us one service: everything that is wrong with modern movies is in that trailer. Old movies had to, or were forced to, or anyway did focus on story, requiring a narrative to drive the film forward. Most modern movies rely on “sequences” that are stitched together. (Too many more are “message” or purposely depressing movies, which bore with certainty.)

Much modern movie making must happen like the following. The producers and directors sit around spitballing and say things like, “Wouldn’t it be cool,” or funny or sad or whatever, “if this happened?” “Yes, that would be cool/funny/sad,” comes the reply. These cool-funny-sad sequences are gathered, the costs of simulating them on a computer or filming them are calculated, the affordable ones are kept and the rest discarded.

Then the big question: “Now that that’s done, how do we put them together?” That’s when the writers must be brought in, to do the thankless and forlorn task of making an edible stew from incongruous ingredients.

If the movie is an “action” movie, a.k.a. cartoon (live action or animated), the sequences are filled with impossible reactions, strings of impossible escapes, and impossible physics. Not one or two impossibilities, but many in rapid-fire succession piled atop one another so there is no time to think about what you just saw was impossible. The result is less gripping than watching somebody play a video game. You never care about anybody, and all you can recall is if this or that sequence was cool.

If the movie is a comedy, as is the Going in Style remake, sight gags and punchlines go in search of situations that might make sense in the loose plot. If a joke is thought funny, the plot is stretched, even past the snapping point. No matter what, the movie is juiced, cramming in as many laughs-per-minute and silly elements as possible.

I admit I am only going by the trailer, but it is clear the remake is a modern movie.

The three old men now live in what Hollywood imagines a Queens apartment looks like: clean and bright, and in reality beyond the means of Social Security. There is no sense three old men, or indeed anybody, actually lives there. The park bench has been replaced by three comfortable seats in front of a huge television (a worse slow death).

In a George Lucas-type move where Han no longer shoots first, the new director has the bank ripping off one of the old men, Michael Caine, giving Caine motive for revenge. As he is in the bank learning of his plight, three men wearing cool masks and cool guns and with ninja cool moves (what a sequence!) rob the bank, giving Caine inspiration. Caine is heard to say, “These banks have practically destroyed this country, and nothing ever happens to them” (a true enough line).

That Caine was cheated on his mortgage is not sufficient motive, however. An evil corporation next tells Morgan Freeman his pension has dissolved. The description of the plot issued by the studio suggests the men are reduced to eating dog food, which is surely no less expensive than people food, yet they are always shown spending money in diners. Alan Arkin at last says “I wanna rob that bank” that ripped us off.

Next comes the cool sequence of the old men using their smart phones to surreptitiously film the bank’s security systems. There is a suggestion the families of the old men play a much larger part in this movie, adding the schmaltz and precociousness that is de rigueur when kids are shown.

Does the robbery come next? No. Who wants to jump right in to a bank robbery when we can instead have the cool and hilarious sequence of the men having a practice robbery of a grocery store? Ann Margret shows up to spill a few sex jokes, because sex jokes from a wrinkled old lady are always hilarious. The grocery store heist goes hilariously awry, and it allows for the hilarious sequence of two men escaping on an electric wheel chair.

Does the robbery come next? No. Who wants to jump right in to a bank robbery with old men, when we can instead have the hilarious sequence and comedic elements of the old men enlisting real hardened criminals to lay out a cool bank-robbing plan? Incidentally, the bank being robbed is not in the city, but is now in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, which is hipper and cooler.

I have no inside information, but I’d bet good money that none of the old men croaks, unless it is to mimic a frog in some hilarious sequence, that the bank managers get their comeuppance in a hilarious way, that the hardened criminals are blamed for the heist in a hilarious and action-packed sequence, that there are adorable and precocious kids romping through money given to their cool charity by the old men, and that the three men ride off into the sunset in some way which bespeaks of vast amounts of money being spent on their conveyance. (After the movie is released, and if you see it, check back here to verify these predictions.)

Since all three men are (it’s true) great actors, there are bound to be some funny lines (especially from Arkin), but a few laughs will be all that anybody remembers.

And that is what makes a modern movie.

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