Three quick chapters will little comment. Well, little is needed. We have more meat next week, when we dip back into eternity. There is some interesting commentary about living beings in Chapter 97.
 HENCE it appears that hatred of a thing cannot be ascribed to God…
 Again. As we have shown above, God’s will tends to things other than Himself, in as much as, by willing and loving His being and goodness, He wills it to be poured forth, as far as possible, by communicating its likeness. Accordingly that which God wills in things other than Himself, is that the likeness of His goodness be in them. Now the goodness of each thing consists in its partaking of the divine likeness: since every other goodness is nothing but a likeness of the first goodness. Therefore God wills good to everything: and consequently He hates nothing.
 Again. From the first being all others take the origin of their being. Wherefore if He hates any one of the things that are, He wills it not to be, because to be is a thing’s good. Hence He wills His action not to be, whereby that thing is brought into being mediately or immediately; for it has been proved above, that if God wills a thing, it follows that He wills whatever is required for that thing. But this is impossible. And this is evident, if things are brought into being by His will, since in that case the action whereby things are produced must be voluntary: and likewise if He be the cause of things naturally, because just as His nature pleases Him, so also everything that His nature requires pleases Him. Therefore God hates not anything…
 And yet God is said metaphorically to hate certain things: and this in two ways. First, from the fact that God in loving things, and willing their good to be, wills the contrary evil not to be. Wherefore He is said to hate evils, since we are said to hate that which we will not to be; according to Zach. viii. 17, Let none of you imagine evil in your hearts against his friend; and love not a false oath, for all these are the things that I hate, saith the Lord. But such things are not His effects as subsistent things, to which hatred or love are directed properly speaking.
 The other way is due to God willing some greater good that cannot be without the privation of a lesser good. And thus He is said to hate, since to do more than this were to love. For, in this way, for as much as He wills the good of justice or of the order of the universe, which good is impossible without the punishment or destruction of some, He is said to hate those whose punishment or destruction He wills; according to Mal. i. 3: I have hated Esau, and the words of the psalm: Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity, thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie: the bloody and the deceitful man the Lord will abhor.
 FROM what has been already proved, it follows of necessity that God is a living being.
 For it has been shown that in God there are intelligence and will. Now intelligence and will are only in that which lives. Therefore God is a living being.
 Again. Life is ascribed to certain things in as much as they seem to be set in motion of themselves and not by another. For which reason, things which seem to be moved of themselves, the cause of which movement is not perceived by the unlearned, are described metaphorically as living: for instance we speak of the living water of a flowing source, but not of a tank or stagnant pond; and of ‘quick’-silver, which seems to have a kind of movement. For properly speaking those things alone are themselves in motion, which move themselves, being composed of mover and moved, such as animate beings.
Wherefore such things alone are said to live, while all others are moved by some other thing, either as generating them, or as removing an obstacle, or as impelling them. And since sensible operations are accompanied by movement, furthermore whatever moves itself to its proper operations, although these be without movement, is said to live: wherefore intelligence, appetite and sensation are vital actions. Now God especially works not as moved by another but by Himself, since He is the first active cause. Therefore to live is befitting Him above all.
Notes Self-movement, in this mechanical age, is no longer a complete definition of life of course.
 FROM this it further appears that God is His own life.
 For life in a living being is the same as to live expressed in the abstract; just as a running is in reality the same as to run. Now in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher declares (2 De Anima). For since an animal is said to be living because it has a soul whereby it has existence, as it were by its proper form, it follows that to live is nothing but a particular kind of existence resulting from a particular kind of form. Now God is His own existence, as proved above. Therefore He is His own living and His own life.
 Again. Intelligence is a kind of life, as the Philosopher declares (2 De Anima): since to live is the act of a living being. Now God is His own act of intelligence, as we have proved. Therefore He is His own living and His own life…