(All the stuff in this series is, in a fuller form, in my new upcoming book, which is tentatively called Logical Probability and Statistics—but I’ve only changed the title 342 times, so don’t count on this one sticking. Incidentally, I’m … Continue reading
Read Part III Just review and clarification this time, folks. Dirty hard work. But necessary given the confusion from last post. Time to pump some neurons! Next time we—finally!—get to parameters, models, and all that. (All the stuff in this … Continue reading
We often have a series of exchanges with friends or others, seeking to convince them of some proposition which we believe is true, and which may even be true. But these friends think the proposition false, and which may even … Continue reading
Following Part II, here are some examples to show the differences between objectivist, subjectivist, and frequentist probabilities derived from fixed premises and set conclusions. Example 1 Not all probability is objectively strictly quantifiable. Premise: “Some X are F and x … Continue reading