# William M. Briggs

### Statistician to the Stars!

#### Page 3 of 546

Rained yesterday here in the city of cities. Must be because of climate change, right? Hey. The climate did change and it did rain. What more evidence do you want?

Bonus trivia question: name a period in which the climate on this island earth never changed.

That’s right, guppies. It’s a trick question. There is no such period! The climate has always changed; therefore, it is rational to suppose that it always will.

“Briggs, you fool. When people say ‘climate change’, they don’t mean the climate changed. They mean the nature of the climate has remained stationary up until some point, after which is changed—and even fools like you know this means a change in the statistical nature of the climate.”

So that if you say, as I’ve heard you say, that temperature is “normally distributed” and yesterday the high was 62F and today the high is 38F, you’d say the temperature didn’t change?

“Well, you know what I mean.”

Funny definition, that. Besides, even if the model—your normal distribution—remained the same from day to day, it’s still true that some thing or things caused the high to plunge (i.e. change), right?

“The climate didn’t change. The temperature did.”

That either makes no sense or it’s a circular argument. Your model—your normal distribution—doesn’t say diddly about what caused the observed change. Do you agree?

“It doesn’t have to! If the model doesn’t change, the climate didn’t change!”

You avoided the question while committing the Deadly Sin of Reification. You’re defining “climate” as your model, and not as the real-life observations. At least you’re in good company. Like that of Gerrit Hansen, Maximilian Auffhammer (cool name), and Andrew R. Solow who wrote a peer-reviewed paper of the same name as today’s post in the Journal of Climate, which makes the same mistakes you make (vol 27, 15 Nov 2014, pp 8297-8301).

These authors define a “stochastic” “point process”, which is to say, a probability model, which describes the uncertainty in event occurrences. Like, say, blog posts. Once a day here—a good and highly accurate model! Which is not meant as a joke. Why?

Their probability model, like any probability model, announces, conditional on specified premises, which usually include past observations, the probability some proposition is true. Thus, given our blog point process model and the history of posts at the venerable WMBriggs.com, you might say the probability “A post shows tomorrow, 11 December 2014″ is high. Tune in tomorrow to see how useful this model is.

Again, this isn’t a joke. I started this blog seven, eight years ago. Back then the climate was different, and so was my posting frequency. It was on the order of twice to thrice a week.

That means were I to fit a point process model to this history of posts, it would show a correlation with climate change. There would be parameters inside this model which would measure this association, parameters which I could use to quantify the correlation, I mean.

Now the real question: is the changing climate causing me to write now daily posts?

Of course not!

And it’s silly to suggest that it is, even though the parameters in our model show a “significant” correlation (with time or climate change). The two things—climate and my fevered imagination—have nothing to do with one another.

Just to be perfectly crystalline transparently forcefully clear, a parameter in a point process model, which might be pegged to time or some other external thing, cannot say why the observed series changes or doesn’t change.

Here’s our authors (pp. 8297-8298):

Given that an event has occurred after the climate has changed, was it or was it not caused by climate change? This question implies that, once climate has changed, the point process of events represents the superposition of a point process of events that would have occurred in the absence of climate change and a point process of events that would not have occurred in the absence of climate change and are, therefore, attributable to climate change. Moreover, these point processes must be independent; otherwise, the former would inherit a climate change effect through the latter.

They assume a model which has a rate indexed by a parameter, and after “climate change” this parameter increases, and the increase is “attributed” to climate change.

As you can see, this whole thing, start to finish, confuses the nature of causality. What does “once climate has changed” even mean? If we knew the climate changed at some point, and how this new “climate” (and the old) caused, say, hurricanes or lightning strikes, then we don’t need a probability model. We’d just say, “There will be this many hurricanes and lightning strikes”—and we could not be wrong.

We certainly don’t need a model to tell us if a hurricane struck. We can just look. And if we don’t know the precise causes of the hurricane, it’s silly to claim it was “caused” by climate change. Some thing or things caused the hurricane before the climate changed and some thing or things will cause hurricanes after the climate changes. The probability model just can’t say anything definitive about causes.

The authors:

Over the 30-yr period 1950–79, there were a total of 39 intense North Atlantic hurricanes while over the following 33-yr period, 1980–2012, there were 53 such hurricanes. If we assume that the effect of climate change over the entire 63-yr period was to increase the rate of these hurricanes, then the ML estimate of the estimated probability that a hurricane in the later period is attributable to climate change is 0.19 and an approximate 0.95 confidence interval for this probability is (-0.17, 0.44).

Again, this makes no causal sense. Add emphasis: “If we assume that the effect of climate change….was to [cause an] increase” then the estimated probability that the hurricane is “attributable”, i.e. caused by, “climate change” ought to be 100% or nothing.

Scientists spend far too much time on these vaporous models when they’d be better off searching for causes and in understanding physics.

New York City Council members engage in a falsely advertised “die in”. Pic from NY POST.

There’s a story in John Toland’s magisterial The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire (volume two) which depicts a Japanese ship transporting Western prisoners in conditions worse than on any (other) slave ship. It was dark, confined, covered in human filth, and unbearably hot. Unbearably is a strong and apt word. The men went mad and what they did to each other is difficult to relate. I won’t try. Few survived.

Ivo Andrić’s must-read The Bridge on the Drina describes the construction of the Mehmed Paša Sokolović Bridge bridge in the sixteenth century by Christians under (at times tyrannical) Muslim rule. In one vivid scene, one of a succession of Muslim rulers decide to punish a man by impaling, directing the executioner to insure the man would survive at least for a day. Would-be “enhanced interrogator operatives” would do well to read this horrifying how-to and sequel.

Incidentally, as often happens with certain places, the bridge was to retain its infamy and was the site of the Višegrad massacre in 1992, in which Serbians slaughtered some 3,000 Bosnians, many of whom where women and children.

There was a certain Roman emperor (which? my memory flags) who used to wine and dine, especially wine, enemies. As the fattened guest excused himself to attend to nature, the emperor had his guest seized and a cord was tied securely around the guest’s penis. This resulted in a prolonged, painful, and, to the demented emperor, hilarious death.

Do we need to discuss the Amalekites? The retreat from Moscow in 1812 (and again in the twentieth century)? The guillotine? Should we recall certain religious practices of the Aztecs? The scene in The Brothers Karamazov in which we learn that babies were tossed in the air to be bayoneted for amusement? The Goths? Cannibalism? The practice of sati (also spelled suttee)? Utopian scheme A, B, …?

Enough. It is impossible to be familiar with any serious literature and not realize the human race is fallen, that man is broken, that bad things have always happened and, at least in this form of our existence, always will. A vale of tears isn’t in it. Evil.

So what kind of childish naive sheltered coddled whimpering intellect would allow itself to be “traumatized” over reading about a minor criminal beating up a shopkeeper and then attempting to do the same to a policeman and getting himself killed in the attempt? Traumatized?

I’ll tell you: Columbia law students.

According to today’s New York Post, “A group of Columbia University law students demanded the school postpone their finals because of their ‘trauma’ over the Eric Garner and Michael Brown grand-jury decisions.”

This demand traumatized the Dean, poor Robert Scott, whose immediate thought was to placate his little dears. He said the decisions “have shaken the faith of some in the integrity of the grand-jury system and in the law more generally.”

Scott said “students who feel that their performance on examinations will be sufficiently impaired due to the effects of these recent events” could apply to have their tests rescheduled.

And not only that: “the school planned to have a trauma expert on hand this week, and several faculty members scheduled special office hours next week ‘to talk about the implications of the Brown and Garner non-indictments.'”

Only two things are possible. Either some or all of the students really are “traumatized”, or some or all of them, like Dean Scott, are lying.

For those who really are traumatized, it confirms critics’ charges that professors and students at “elite” universities are disconnected from all reality, that the true state of the world is a mystery to these ivory tower denizens, that these folks prefer fantasy and their own sad company to mixing with normal human beings. It proves that none of these kiddies has ever read a book and that they are therefore monumentally ignorant.

For those who are lying, it confirms what everybody thinks about lawyers. That they will say anything to get what the want, the truth be damned, that they are out only for themselves and that they are willing to ride over any (like their brother and sister students who actually studied) that get in their way. It proves that modern politicians (like Scott) are gutless and unmanly.

No matter which, it proves what we already knew to be true. That people like “trauma experts” are willing to inflate the importance of events just so they can cash in. And that self-satisfied idiocy can be found anywhere, but especially at Western universities.

Update Not to be under done, Harvard weepies want in on the posturing.

Way my dad and I used to play is that when somebody won they got to grab the hand of the loser and then, with the fore- and middle-fingers only, slap the loser on the wrist. My dad would lick his fingers (“to cut down on air resistance”) before whacking me.

Say, these days that would be child abuse. Well, the government knows best, right?

Briefly, you and simultaneously your opponent select rock, paper, or scissors. Rock breaks scissors, paper covers rock, and scissors cut paper. There are 9 outcomes: 3 of which are rock for you, and rock, paper, or scissors for your enemy; et cetera. Three of the 9 outcomes are ties, in which nobody gets slapped; there are 3 ways for you to lose, and 3 ways for you to win.

Now, given just those premises, and none other, what is the probability you don’t get slapped? Well, “don’t get slapped” means tying or winning; and since there are 6 ways for these things to happen, the chance is 2/3. Similarly, there is a 1/3 chance for you to lose, and 1/3 probability you get to slap.

These deduced probabilities are correct assuming only the premises describing the rules of the game. Which implies, and it is true, that the probabilities are not likely to be correct assuming other premises. What other premises? There are an infinite number of premises we might choose, but what we’re after are premises that help us win the game.

The thing to emphasize is that we know with certainty the non-human premises, and so know with certainty the non-human probabilities. Rock paper scissors is thus similar to poker where we have a good handle on the probabilities; but where in poker they are harder to memorize, yet in poker we know there are consistent and good players.

There are also consistently winning Rock Paper Scissors players. Like 2008 champion Sean “Wicked Fingers” Sears. That means, like poker, human premises must exist that change the odds.

In any number of places you’ll read that the way not to get beat is to make your pick “randomly.” This is impossible. No matter what, you must cause your pick, and no cause in the universe is ontologically “random.” Suppose you decide to divide up a minute into thirds and pick based on the secondhand of your watch. If your opponent does not know this, he has no way of guessing what you’ll do (except that you must choose, of course), and so to him your guess is “random”—which means only unknown. But to you, the choice is determined, caused by your decision and the state of the time.

If your opponent catches you sneaking peeks before each round, then he’ll too know what you’re going to do—creating a new and probative and deductive premise for him—and you’ll consistently lose.

That’s the way to win, too. By searching for patterns, i.e. premises, which your opponent is using, knowingly or not. Bin Xu and pals think they’ve discovered patterns many people use. In their arxiv paper “Cycle frequency in standard Rock-Paper-Scissors games: Evidence from experimental economics” they posit that winners often repeat their winning pick, and losers select the next object in the cycle (lose with scissors and move to rock). Armed (handed?) with these premises allows you to change the odds.

Until your opponent figures out his mistake; and when he does, he can use that knowledge against you. Figuring you are figuring on a rock (since your opponent just lost on a scissors), and thus you’d pick paper, your opponent upends the algorithm and sticks with scissors.

Noted RPS expert Sharisa Bufford, a member of the prestigious USA Rock Paper Scissors League, is sure that “Girls always throw scissors first. Guys always throw rock.” If that’s so, these are winning premises. Unless your opponent knows these rules, too. And you know they know. And you know they know you know…you know?

Now it’s true you cannot “pick randomly” but must always cause a choice. But that does not mean it’s impossible to discover a strategy which your opponent cannot guess—where your opponent may be some “sophisticated computer” (computers are only dumb unthinking distillations of fractions of human brains). All it takes to create impossible-to-discover picks are to create picks which your opponent cannot guess beyond the standard premises (a tautology, really).

Maybe that’s memorizing a stream of numbers generated by some process which remains unknown to your opponent. Or maybe that means changing your picking algorithm based on circumstance. All that matters is that your opponent cannot guess.

Incidentally and curiously, computer programs which test “randomness” (i.e. unpredictability) always turn a blind eye to the algorithm which generated the sequence they’re testing.

Lastly, to prove (as I’ve done before) that I can pick a number you cannot guess with certainty, no matter what your resources, I’m thinking of a number between 0 and 4. What is it? (It’s hidden in the code to this page.)

This may be proved in three ways. The first…

See the first post in this series for an explanation and guide of our tour of Summa Contra Gentiles. All posts are under the category SAMT.

Previous post.

Today some (I think the term is) theological brush clearing. Three chapters which prove, in effect, that God is superior to man. Only post-moderns and fallen angels doubt this, so we needn’t spend too much time here. Take this time to review, then, because next week new metaphysical terms are introduced.

Chapter 29: Of The Likeness Of Creatures

4 Dionysius is in agreement with this argument, for he says (Div. Nom. ix.): The same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as they can, Who is not perfectly imitable; unlike, according as effects fall short of their causes.

5 However,[3] according to this likeness, it is more fitting to say that the creature is like God than vice versa. For one thing is like another when it possesses a quality or form thereof. Since then what is in God perfectly is found in other things by way of an imperfect participation, that in which likeness is observed is God’s simply but not the creature’s. And thus the creature has what is God’s, and therefore is rightly said to be like God. But it cannot be said in this way that God has what belongs to His creature: wherefore neither is it fitting to say that God is like His creature; as neither do we say that a man is like his portrait, although we declare that his portrait is like him…i

Chapter 30: What Terms Can Be Predicated Of God

1 AGAIN in sequel to the above we may consider what can and what cannot be said of God; also what is said of Him alone, and what is said of Him together with other beings.

2 For since every perfection of creatures is to be found in God, albeit in another and more eminent way, whatever terms denote perfection absolutely and without any defect whatever, are predicated of God and of other things; for instance, goodness, wisdom, and so forth. But any term that denotes suchlike perfections together with a mode proper to creatures, cannot be said of God except by similitude and metaphor, whereby that which belongs to one thing is applied to another, as when a man is said to be a stone on account of the denseness of his intelligence.ii

Such are all those terms employed to denote the species of a created thing, as man and stone: for its proper mode of perfection and being is due to each species: likewise whatever terms signify those properties of things that are caused by the proper principles of the species, therefore they cannot be said of God otherwise than metaphorically. But those which express these perfections together with the mode of supereminence in which they belong to God, are said of God alone, for instance the sovereign good, the first being, and the like…

Chapter 31: That The Divine Perfection And The Plurality Of Divine Names Are Not Inconsistent With The Divine Simplicity

1 FROM what has been said we are also able to see that the divine perfection and the various names applied to God are not inconsistent with His simplicity.iii

1 For we asserted that all the perfections to be found in other things are to be ascribed to God in the same way as effects are found in their equivocal causes:[1] which causes are in their effects virtually, as heat is in the sun. Now this virtue unless it were in some way of the genus of heat, the sun acting thereby would not generate its like. Wherefore by reason of this virtue the sun is said to be hot, not only because it causes heat, but because the virtue whereby it does this, is something in conformity with heat. Now by this same virtue by which the sun causes heat, it causes also many other effects in lower bodies, such as dryness. And so heat and dryness, which are distinct qualities in fire, are ascribed to the sun in respect of the one virtue.iv

And so too, the perfections of all things, which are becoming to other things in respect of various forms, must needs be ascribed to God in respect of His one virtue. And this virtue is not distinct from His essence, since nothing can be accidental to Him, as we have proved.[2] Accordingly God is said to be wise not only because He causes wisdom, but because in so far as we are wise, we imitate somewhat the virtue whereby He makes us wise. He is not however called a stone, although He made the stones, because by the term stone we understand a definite mode of being, in respect of which a stone differs from God.[3] But a stone imitates God as its cause, in respect of being, goodness and so forth, even as other creatures do.v

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[3] Sum. Th., l.c., ad 4. [Referencing chapter 29]

[1] Coel. Hier. ii. 3. [Referencing chapter 30]

[1] Ch. xxix. [Referencing chapter 31]
[2] Ch. xxiii.

iThis is plain enough. It is only some academics and politicians who think they are gods themselves. I skipped lightly over the obvious that causes are greater than their effects, etc.; that a cause does not have to give the whole of itself, as it were, etc. Review!

iiSpeaking of the same individuals… Anyway, I believe the modern terms are “brick”, “thick”, or just “dense.”

iiiPlease don’t forget simplicity is here a technical term, meaning not made of parts, with no potentiality, and those kinds of things. It does not mean easy nor lacking nor any other colloquial shade of the word.

ivIn other word, the sun can do more than one thing even though it itself is only one thing. What thing it does “at the moment” depends on focus. We would never make the mistake of saying, “The sun is warming me therefore it can’t also be lighting my path.” The sun, of course, also provides a point for us to rotate about; it also “hardens” the atmosphere and allows radio waves to propagate over long distances; and many other things. You get the idea.

vHe is also not called a (human) body, even though He made bodies, because by the term body we understand a definite mode of being. It is also significant that wisdom, or rather being wise or unwise, is something we do with our intellects, and our intellects are not material.