William M. Briggs

U Penn’s Latest Conn: Religious Schools Shouldn’t Be Accredited

24 July 2014 / Matt Briggs / 13 Comments

We sell only the best educations. Trust me!

Tell the truth: English Departments at our “top” universities are stuffed to the quad with (A) Progressives or (B) Conservatives?

Anybody claiming (B) is either ignorant (I mean this politely) of university politics or lying, and probably lying. Does the correct answer, (A), thus imply English Departments contain only leftist ideologues? No, sir, it does not. It does however mean that the majority of the faculty will be slavishly devoted to NPR and Jon Stewart, and that the minority of tradition-minded faculty will have learned to keep their mouths shut, or face being purged.

Here’s another opportunity for truthfulness: would you rather have your offspring learn English from a Department which bases its lessons on books chosen for (A) political correctness and the demographic characteristics and sexual proclivities (and excesses) of their authors, or (B) their intrinsic beauty and cultural importance?

If you said (A), then you’ll be happy to learn that our top universities, each accredited by sober agencies, are just the place. Think of accreditation as a secular imprimatur, an official guarantee that your child will not be able to take her mind off race and sex, even if she wanted to.

But if (B) is your choice, well, you’re running out of options. Best bet is to try a smaller school, perhaps even a Christian one (like many top schools used to be, e.g. Harvard, Georgetown). If you told the truth on the first question, you already know why.

Christian and religious schools are accredited, too. They (think they) have to be. Money is on the line. Our government, in its wisdom, says schools must be accredited else no loans to students, and no money to the schools, either (a simplification, but largely on the mark). If a school lacks accreditation, the credits earned by students won’t be transferable, and degree-obsessed employers might not accept the diploma.

The aptly named Peter Conn, a professor of English and education at the University of Pennsylvania, wants Christian schools to lose their accreditation. He says that any Christian school receives accreditation is a farce, as he writes in the Chronicle of Higher Education.

Conn is upset at the insularity of religious schools. His obvious unfamiliarity with Christianity explains why he doesn’t know Matthew 7:3. Don’t bother to look it up. It’s the one about the plank in the eye.

Conn, a man, says accreditation “confers legitimacy on institutions that systematically undermine the most fundamental purposes of higher education.” Purpose? Hmm. Conn’s school is hosting a talk by Amanda Lock Swarr, “Forcing Sex: Violent Contestations over South African Masculinities.” Where “In preparation, we will be reading the introduction to Sex in Transition as well as ‘Paradoxes of Butchness: Lesbian Masculinities and Sexual Violence in Contemporary South Africa.’”

Or you could attend the Queer Method Conference, but I’m afraid we’ve already missed the ARCH center’s symposium on Addressing Global Rape Culture.

Conn, a man, says, “Skeptical and unfettered inquiry is the hallmark of American teaching and research.” Conn, a man, says, “such inquiry cannot flourish—in many cases, cannot even survive—inside institutions that erect religious tests for truth. The contradiction is obvious.”

At U. Penn, you can sign up for ENGL 090.401, Gender, Sexuality and Literature: Our Cyborgs, Our Selves: “Women’s bodies have also been among scifi’s most persistent objects of analysis…” Or ENGL 390.401, Reproductive Fictions: “fictional narratives often prompt us to consider how and why certain bodies, lives, and social structures are reproduced.”

Conn, a man, says accrediting Christian schools is a “scandal” and a “fiasco” and that it “makes a mockery of whatever academic and intellectual standards the process of accreditation is supposed to uphold.”

At U. Penn, you can take ENGL 769.401 Feminisms and Postcolonialities: “…to explore key intersections of gender and sexuality with the dynamics of colonialism, decolonization, nationhood, and globalization.”

Conn, a man, says, “Let me be clear. I have no particular objection to like-minded adherents of one or another religion banding together, calling their association a college, and charging students for the privilege of having their religious beliefs affirmed.”

Hey, Conn, man, I agree with you. It has “become a melancholy fact of our contemporary cultural life” that university humanities departments have become bastions of asininities and foolish thought.

My advice to tradition- and reason-based schools is to skip accreditation. Do you really want to be in the same camp with Conn’s English Department? Accreditation costs too much anyway. Eschew government money. Do you really want to grip the purse strings of an increasingly immoral Mother?

13 Comments

Lovejoy’s New Attempt To Show We Are Doomed Does Not Convince

23 July 2014 / Matt Briggs / 29 Comments

Lovejoy’s new model.

We last met Shaun Lovejoy when he claimed that mankind caused global temperatures to increase. At the 99.9% level, of course.

He’s now saying that the increase which wasn’t observed wasn’t there because of natural variability. But, he assures us, we’re still at fault

His entire effort is beside the point. If the “pause” wasn’t predicted, then the models are bad and the theories that drive them probably false. It matters not whether such pauses are “natural” or not.

Tell me honestly. Is this sentence in Lovejoy’s newest peer-reviewed (“Return periods of global climate
fluctuations and the pause”, Geophysical Research Letters) foray science or politics? “Climate change deniers have been able to dismiss all the model results and attribute the warming to natural causes.”

The reason scientists like Yours Truly have dismissed the veracity of climate models is for the eminently scientific reason that models which cannot make skillful forecasts are bad. And this is so even if you don’t want them to be. Even if you love them. Even if the models are consonant with a cherished and desirable ideology.

Up to a constant, Lovejoy’s curious model says the global temperature is caused by climate sensitivity (at double CO₂) times the log of the ratio of the time varying CO₂ concentration, all plus the “natural” global temperature.

There is no such thing. I mean, there is no such thing as a natural temperature in the absence of mankind. This is because mankind, like every other plant and animal species ever, has been influencing the climate since its inception. Only a denier would deny this.

Follow me closely. Lovejoy believes he can separate out the effects of humans on temperature and thus estimate what the temperature would be were man not around. Forget that such a quantity is of no interest (to any human being), or that such a task is hugely complex. Such estimates are possible. But so are estimates of temperature assuming the plot from the underrated pre-Winning Charlie Sheen movie The Arrival is true.

Let Lovejoy say what he will of T_nat(t) (as he calls it). Since this is meant to be science, how do we verify that Lovejoy isn’t talking out of his chapeau? How do we verify his conjectures? For that is all they are, conjectures. I mean, I could create my own estimate of T_nat(t), and so you could you—and so could anybody. Statistics is a generous, if not a Christian, field. The rule of statistical modeling is, Ask and ye shall receive. How do we tell which estimate is correct?

Answer: we cannot.

But—there’s always a but in science—we might believe Lovejoy was on to something if, and only if, his odd model were able to predict new data, data he had never before seen. Has he done this?

Answer: he has not.

His Figure shown above (global temp) might be taken as a forecast, though. His model is a juicy increase. Upwards and onwards! Anybody want to bet that this is the course the future temperature will actually take? If it doesn’t, Lovejoy is wrong. And no denying it.

After fitting his “GCM-free methodology” model, Lovejoy calculates the chances of seeing certain features in T_nat(t), all of which are conditional on his model and the correctness of T_nat(t). Meaning, if his model is fantasia, so are the probabilities about T_nat(t).

Oh, did I mention that Lovejoy first smoothed his time series? Yup: “a 1-2-1 running filter” (see here and here for more on why not to do this).

Lovejoy concludes his opus with the words, “We may still be battling the climate skeptic arguments that the models are
untrustworthy and that the variability is mostly natural in origin.”

Listen: if the GCMs (not just Lovejoy’s curious entry) made bad forecasts, they are bad models. It matters not that they “missed” some “natural variability.” The point is they made bad forecasts. That means that misidentified whatever it was that caused the temperature to take the values it did. That may be “natural variability” or things done by mankind. But it must be something. It doesn’t even matter if Lovejoy’s model is right: the GCMs were wrong.

He says the observed “pause” “has a convincing statistical explanation.” It has Lovejoy’s explanation. But I, or you, could build your own model and show that the “pause” does not have a convincing statistical explanation.

Besides, who gives a fig-and-a-half for statistical explanations? We want causal explanations. We want to know why things happen. We already know that they happened.

29 Comments

On The Kaya Identity

22 July 2014 / Matt Briggs / 50 Comments

A valid identity.

A reader asked about my take on the Kaya wars that are flaming at Anthony Watts’s place.

Here is the form of the Kaya Identity, which is to say, the Kaya non-equation:

$Y = X_1 \times \frac{X_2}{X_1} \times \frac{X_3}{X_2} \times \dots \times \frac{X_{n}}{X_{n-1}} \times \frac{Y}{X_n}$ ,

The Ys and X_is are numbers and a free choice, given the limitations of algebra (no X_i equals 0). Try it and see: for fun, let $X_i = i$ . Works. A perfectly harmless manipulation.

There is no explicit word about causality in the Kaya. The X_is aren’t necessarily causing the Y or each other. If we wanted to know about what caused Y, and we believed that the X_is were in the causal path of Y, we wouldn’t set up an identity but an equation which looked like this:

$Y = f(X,\beta)$ .

Where X is a vector and where the vector of (known and unknown) parameters β may be larger or smaller than X. Notice that Y does not appear on the right hand side. We are solving for Y here. One possibility (and probably a too simple one for most Y)is a linear equation:

$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \dots + \beta_1 X_n$ .

This is not regression. This is a causal model: it says Y will certainly change by $\beta_i$ when $X_i$ increases by 1 unit. Regression is a probability relationship where we first assume $Y \sim N(\mu, \sigma)$ and then substitute μ for Y on the left hand side. Regressions says Y might, not that it certainly will, change.

Anyway, since the Kaya is an identity we can put anything we like in for the X_is and Y. Let’s try.

$\mbox{CO}_2 = \mbox{Puppies} \times \frac{\mbox{Cats}}{\mbox{Puppies}} \times \frac{\mbox{Meteors}}{\mbox{Cats}} \times \frac{\mbox{Cosmic rays}}{\mbox{Meteors}} \times \frac{\mbox{CO}_2}{\mbox{Cosmic rays}}$ ,

where each is a number existent or occurring over a year in some suitable units. Notice that I was careful to put things that we know change over time, but I needn’t have. Everything could be static (more or less), like this:

$\mbox{CO}_2 = \mbox{Mountain ranges} \times \frac{\mbox{Continents}}{\mbox{Mountain ranges}} \times \frac{\mbox{Great lakes}}{\mbox{Continents}} \times \frac{\mbox{Gold}}{\mbox{Great lakes}} \times \frac{\mbox{CO}_2}{\mbox{Gold}}$ .

Some of these quantities are known for sure, and one, the amount of Gold, is not. But whether we know the value of any of these is immaterial to the Kaya. As long as none are null quantities, and Gold isn’t, we’re in business. Also note that the number of entries was up to me. I could have made the list shorter or longer as I pleased.

What do any of these things have to do with CO₂? Who said the items had to have anything to do with CO₂? Who said I had to use CO₂? Insisting that the X_is are causative of Y and using the Kaya and not an equation is doing it, as they say, the hard way.

But we can certainly manufacture cause-like stories. Puppies eat, and their food both requires and releases CO₂. Cats, too. Meteorites often have carbon in them, and boy do they disturb the atmosphere; lots of cloud nucleii strewn hither and thither during their journey. Same thing with cosmic rays. Plus, these energetic creatures effect life, and life is important for understanding carbon. This is just off the top of the head; spend some serious time and you can spin this tale out to saga length. Peer reviewed, of course.

The same thing can be done with the fixed Xs. Or with any items you care to put into the Kaya. As long as you stay away from 0, you’re in business.

Here’s what Kaya himself put (adapted to just the USA):

$\mbox{CO}_2 = \mbox{Population} \times \frac{\mbox{GDP}}{\mbox{Population}} \times \frac{\mbox{Energy}}{\mbox{GDP}} \times \frac{\mbox{CO}_2}{\mbox{Energy}}$ .

This is just as valid as the examples above, though this one seems more popular with economists. But then economists are prone to tying everything to GDP, which is a number, and economists love numbers (those without uncertainty, that is), often preferring them over reality. Never mind.

For an example of the Kaya in action, see the Pielke Jr video embedded at this link starting at around 21 minutes. Pielke appears to believe that the Kaya has something to do with causation and that he and fellow economists have captured all they need know about human beings and carbon.

The good news from an analytical standpoint is that there’s nothing else. There’s no other levers that you can use out there. This is comprehensive. You may wish there was some rabbit you can pull out of a hat because the good news is also the bad news: this is all you have.

That’s false, as we know from the Puppies example (recall we can add puppies or gold or whatever to the Kaya). And these items—GDP, etc.—are far from all we know about humans and carbon, though Pielke calls it an “extremely powerful tool for policy analysis.” For instance, he says (around 20 min. mark) that, as a lever governments can pull, “Less people, all else equal, equals less emissions” (I believe the guillotine had a similar lever). Another lever the government can yank, he says, is to purposely create poverty, i.e. “Limit generation of wealth” (does that include the wealth of government, one wonders?).

These claims are not quite false, but not quite true, either. More people mean more energy is used, but there’s also a greater chance for more innovation in, say, creating more efficient energy sources. And more people also means more food, and food is a terrific carbon sequestration vehicle, to say it in economic-speak. (Incidentally, one reason that there are more people is that there is more food.)

Now there’s nothing wrong with grappling with crude ratios like Energy/GDP to have some rough, first-blush idea of the amount of energy that is now required to generate such-and-such-a-sized economy, but as for the energy required to drive a future economy, who knows? Nobody in 1990 predicted Google. The Kaya is not a forecasting tool. And since it doesn’t carry any measure of uncertainty, and since every term is mixed up causally with every other term, nobody knows how much credence to give it.

And we can’t bypass the hard work of actually estimating the amount of carbon released and sequestered, both now and in the future. Yet the Kaya is mute on what causes CO₂. GDP, after all, doesn’t cause CO₂. That’s impossible.

The Kaya should be replaced with a probability model/equation, which can tell us how much change in GDP might be associated with a change in CO₂.

That model ought to be under the same constraint as climate models. If it can’t make skillful predictions of future data, we shouldn’t believe it. Right? And how good are economists at forecasting the GDP or energy use one to two decades out?

Update I should have mentioned this above, but it might be in some problem that we know the last ratio Y/X_n (and each other ratio) but that we do not know Y. The Kaya can then be used to calculate Y. But in the case of CO_2, we do not know the last ratio.

50 Comments

Philosophic Issues in Cosmology: II. Relativistic Theories On Universe Origin—Guest Post by Bob Kurland

21 July 2014 / Bob Kurland / 7 Comments

Robert Millikan, Georges Lamaitre, and A. Einstein (with hat).

Bob Kurland is a retired, cranky, old physicist, and convert to Catholicism. He shows that there is no contradiction between what science tells us about the world and our Catholic faith.

There was a young lady named Bright,Whose speed was far faster than light;She started one day In a relative way, And returned on the previous night. A.H.R. Buller, Punch

Read Part I.

The usual exposition of Einstein’s General Relativity Field Equations is very forbidding, full of Greek subscripts and tensor notation; a clear, simplified version has been given on the web by John Baez, and is appropriate for considering the Big Bang. The standard general relativity model for cosmology is that given by Friedmann-LeMaitre-Robertson-Walker,¹ usually designated by FLRW.

The FLRW model proceeds from the following simplifying assumptions: a) the universe is isotropic (looks the same in every direction, from every point in space); b) there is a constant amount of matter in the universe; c) on a large scale (hundreds of times the distance between galaxies) the universe has a homogeneous matter density (matter is spread evenly throughout space); d) the effects of “pressure” (from radiation or the vacuum) can be neglected.

With these simplifying assumptions, the equation for the “size” of the universe, its radius R, becomes simple, and looks just like the equation of motion for a particle traveling under an inverse square law, like that of gravity. (Note: this is not to say the size of the universe is really given by some value R, but to show how space is expanding; the universe might possibly be infinite—more about that later).

The universe might expand and then contract in a “Big Crunch” (like a ball falling back to earth), corresponding to positively curved spacetime (like a sphere); it might expand with a constant velocity of expansion (like a projectile going into orbit), corresponding to flat space-time (like a plane); or it might expand with an accelerating velocity of expansion (like a projectile achieving escape velocity), corresponding to a saddle-shaped curvature of space-time. It should also be emphasized that the FLRW solution to the Einstein General Relativity equations is by no means unique, nor is it the only solution with a singularity. It is a model, however, that is in accord with measured data (red shift, COBE microwave background radiation).

The assumptions stated above do not apply rigorously. Observations have shown a filament or bubble-like structure to the universe with clusters and meta-clusters of galaxies. (A theoretical picture for this filament structure has been proposed.) In the early stages of the universe radiation pressure was very likely significant.

More recently, measurements have shown that the expansion rate is increasing, which is presumed due to “dark energy”, possibly a pressure due to vacuum energy. Moreover, at some point in the expansion the scale of the universe gets so small that classical physics does not apply and quantum mechanics has to be used for theory. Unfortunately, quantum mechanics and general relativity have not yet been reconciled into one general theory, so there is a fundamental difficulty with this melding of the two theories.

The simple solution above for FLRW models gives an acceleration of R proportional to 1/R^2, which signifies that there is a singularity at R=0, that is to say, if you try to plug in R=0 you’ll get infinity. This would be the same as the infinity at the source for other forces proportional to 1/R^2, coulomb attraction or gravity. Ellis has this to say about the significance and existence of the FLRW singularity:

[T]he universe starts at a space-time singularity…This is not merely a start to matter—it is a start to space, to time, to physics itself. It is the most dramatic event in the history of the universe: it is the start of existence of everything. The underlying physical feature is the non-linear nature of the EFE (Einstein Field Equation): going back into the past, the more the universe contracts, the higher the active gravitational density, causing it to contract even more…a major conclusion is that a Hot Big Bang must have occurred; densities and temperatures must have risen at least to high enough energies that quantum fields were significant, at something like the GUT (Grand Unified Theory) energy. The universe must have reached those extreme temperatures and energies at which classical theory breaks down. [Emphasis in original.]

Ellis is saying that even though we can’t observe the universe at that time when it was so small and temperatures were so high that quantum properties would have been significant, we can infer that this was the case theoretically, that is to say that there was a “Hot Big Bang” at the beginning of the universe with extremely high temperatures (energies)and an extremely small volume.

Thus, given the contracting size of the universe as one goes back to the origin, there will be a time such that quantum effects must come into play. However, there are some basic limitations to using quantum mechanics as a theory for the origin of the universe. As Ellis points out:

The attempt to develop a fully adequate quantum gravity approach to cosmology is of course hampered by the lack of a fully adequate theory of quantum gravity, as well as by the problems at the foundation of quantum theory (the measurement problem, collapse of the wave function, etc.).

The Hawking-Penrose Theorems also show that a class of solutions to the General Relativity equations have a singularity in the solution. The Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem shows that under conditions of universe average expansion, there is a beginning point. Since all such solutions are non-applicable at the singularity because quantum gravity enters the picture, the relevance of such theorems is perhaps questionable.

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¹Editor’s note: Georges LeMaitre was a Catholic priest and professor of physics. “He was the first known academic to propose the theory of the expansion of the Universe, widely misattributed to Edwin Hubble.” See also Stigler’s law of eponymy.

7 Comments

Summary Against Modern Thought: The Last Movement

20 July 2014 / Matt Briggs / 41 Comments

This may be proved in three ways. The first…

See the first post in this series for an explanation and guide of our tour of Summa Contra Gentiles.

Previous post.

Recall that the First Way has already been done. Meaning we already have one proof for God’s existence. This is the second, and the good news is that most of our terminology has already been introduced. A lot to do today, but the good news is that this is the last of Chapter 13! But these proofs are all we have. We don’t yet know anything about God except that He’s the Unmoved Mover, the Unchanging Changer. What can that mean? That’s coming.

Chapter 13: Arguments in proof of God’s existence

18 Again, if any two things are found accidentallyⁱ united in a certain subject, and one of them is to be found without the other, it is probable that the latter can be found without the former: thus if white and musical are found in Socrates, and musical without white is found in Plato, it is probable that it is possible to find white without musical in some subject.

Accordingly if mover and moved be united together in some subject accidentally, and it be found that a certain thing is moved without its being a mover, it is probable that a mover is to be found that is not moved. Nor can one urge against this the case of two things one of which depends on the other; because those in question are united not per se but accidentally.

If, however, the aforesaid proposition is true in itself, again there follows something impossible or unfitting. For the mover must needs be moved either by the same kind of movement or by another kind. If by the same kind, it follows that whatever causes alteration must itself be altered, and furthermore that the healer must be healed, that the teacher must be taught, and in respect of the same science. But this is impossible: for the teacher must needs have science, while the learner must needs not have it, and thus the same will be both possessed and not possessed by the same, which is impossible.ⁱⁱ

And if it be moved by another kind of movement, so that, to wit, that which causes alteration be moved in respect of place, and that which moves in respect of place be increased, and so on, it will follow that we cannot go on indefinitely, since the genera and species of movement are finite in number.ⁱⁱⁱ And thus there will be some first mover that is not moved by another. Unless, perchance, someone say that a recurrence takes place, in this way, that when all the genera and species of movement have been exhausted, a return must be made to the first; for instance, if that which moves in respect of place be altered, and that which causes alteration be increased, then again that which is increased be moved in respect of place. But the consequence of this will be the same as before; namely, that which moves by one kind of movement is itself moved by the same kind, not immediately indeed but mediately.^iv It remains therefore that we must needs postulate some first mover that is not moved by anything outside itself.

19 Since however, given that there is a first mover that is not moved by anything outside itself,^v it does not follow that it is absolutely immovable, Aristotle proceeds further, saying that this may happen in two ways. First, so that this first mover is absolutely immovable. And if this be granted, our point is established, namely that there is a first immovable mover. Secondly, that this first mover is moved by itself. And this seems probable: because what is of itself is always prior to what is of another: wherefore also in things moved, it is logical that what is moved first is moved by itself and not by another.

20 But, if this be granted, the same consequence follows.[18] For it cannot be said that the whole of that which moves itself is moved by its whole self, because then the absurd consequences mentioned above would follow, namely that a person might teach and be taught at the same time, and in like manner as to other kinds of movement; and again that a thing would be at the same time in act and in potentiality, since a mover, as such, is in act, while that which is moved is in potentiality.^vi It remains, therefore, that one part thereof is mover only, and the other part moved. And thus we have the same conclusion as before, namely that there is something that moves and is itself immovable.

21 And it cannot be said that both parts are moved, so that one is moved by the other; nor that one part moves both itself and the other; nor that the whole moves a part; nor that part moves the whole, since the above absurdities would follow, namely that something would both move and be moved by the same kind of movement, and that it would be at the same time in potentiality and in act, and moreover that the whole would move itself not primarily but by reason of its part. It remains, therefore, that in that which moves itself, one part must be immovable, and must move the other part.

22 Since, however, in those things among us which move themselves, namely animals, the part which moves, namely the soul, though immovable of itself, is nevertheless moved accidentally, he goes on to show that in the first mover, the part which moves is not moved neither of itself nor accidentally.[19]^vii

23 For in those things which among us move themselves, namely animals, since they are corruptible, the part which moves is moved accidentally. Now those corruptible things which move themselves must needs be reducible to some first self-mover that is everlasting. Therefore that which moves itself must have a mover, which is moved neither of itself nor accidentally.

24 It is clear that, in accordance with his hypothesis, some self-mover must be everlasting. For if, as he supposes, movement is everlasting, the production of these self-movers that are subject to generation and corruption must be everlasting. But no one of these self-movers, since it does not always exist, can be the cause of this everlastingness. Nor can all of them together, both because they would be infinite, and because they do not exist all together. It follows therefore that there must be an everlasting self-mover, that causes the everlastingness of generation in these lower self-movers. And thus its mover is not moved, neither of itself nor accidentally.

Again, we observe that in self-movers some begin to be moved anew on account of some movement whereby the animal is not moved by itself, for instance by the digestion of food or a change in the atmosphere: by which movement the mover that moves itself is moved accidentally. Whence we may gather that no self-mover, whose mover is moved per se or accidentally, is always moved. But the first self-mover is always in motion, else movement could not be everlasting, since every other movement is caused by the movement of the first self-mover. It follows therefore that the first self-mover is moved by a mover who is not moved, neither per se nor accidentally…^viii

30 The Philosopher proceeds in a different way in 2 Metaph. to show that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in efficient causes, and that we must come to one first cause, and this we call God. This is how he proceeds. In all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate, whether the intermediate be one or several. Now if the cause be removed, that which it causes is removed. Therefore if we remove the first the intermediate cannot be a cause. But if we go on to infinity in efficient causes, no cause will be first. Therefore all the others which are intermediate will be removed. Now this is clearly false. Therefore we must suppose the existence of a first efficient cause: and this is God.^ix

31 Another reason can be drawn from the words of Aristotle. For in 2 Metaph.[22] he shows that those things which excel as true excel as beings: and in 4 Metaph.[23] he shows that there is something supremely true, from the fact that we see that of two false things one is falser than the other, wherefore it follows that one also is truer than the other. Now this is by reason of approximation to that which is simply and supremely true. Wherefore we may further conclude that there is something that is supremely being. And this we call God.^x

32 Another argument in support of this conclusion is adduced by Damascene[24] from the government of things: and the same reasoning is indicated by the Commentator in 2 Phys.[25] It runs as follows. It is impossible for contrary and discordant things to accord in one order always or frequently except by someone’s governance, whereby each and all are made to tend to a definite end. Now we see that in the world things of different natures accord in one order, not seldom and fortuitously, but always or for the most part. Therefore it follows that there is someone by whose providence the world is governed. And this we God.^xi

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ⁱA circle can be accidentally red or yellow and still be a circle, etc. A thing is not defined by its accidents.

ⁱⁱAquinas created this argument in ignorance of our modern educational system, of course. But he’s still right.

ⁱⁱⁱYou can change quantity, mass, color, place, and the like, but there are not an infinite number of changeable qualities.

^ivDon’t loose sight of the main example, the stone moved by the stick moved by the arm moved by the muscles, etc., all in the here and now. This movement cannot be circularly caused.

^vWe’re starting to hone in on (but have not reached) the idea that there can be only one Unmoved Mover, and not an assemblage of them. Not gods, but God.

^viYou cannot potentially and actually be in Cleveland simultaneously. Aquinas is speaking ontologically, not epistemologically. And this reminds me that we have to, sometime soon, introduce Jaki’s criticisms of complementarity.

^viiWe’ll also do this more later. But, for now, the soul of the animal is its form. Things are composed of forms and substances or matter. Clay, a substance, can be in the form of an ashtray (eek!) or (say) a model car. Speaking loosely, and later correctly, the soul animates the substance. The souls of plants are lesser than the souls of animals, which in turn are lesser than the souls of men. Like I said, this is only a crude introduction. Let’s stick here to the argument of movement, else we will be arguing that of which we have incomplete information.

^viiiYou may feel buried after these last two paragraphs. Slow reading is in order. Again, Aquinas is leading us to why there can be only one Unmoved Mover. There’s no getting around that this last proof is rather dry—I even leave out some discussion about movement of heavenly bodies—but it dots all the Js and crosses all the Xs.

^ixHere it is in a compact form! This is the elevator proof. Pretty, too.

^xI don’t think Aquinas expected this snippet to be convincing in itself, but included it as an augment to main argument. Here’s a good article from Swinburne on the argument from the beauty of design, and another by Williams on beauty.

^xiAnd this sketch is cruder still. It’s doubtful that it, in this telegraphic form, would convince any moderns. I’m not expert enough in Medieval history to know why Aquinas included it, which audience he had in mind.

Hooray! We are finally done with Chapter 13! But not entirely done with motion.

[18] 8 Phys., l.c.
[19] 8 Phys. vi.
[22] D. 1a. i. 5.
[23] D. 3. iv. 27, 28.
[24] De Fide Orth. i. 3.
[25] Text 75.

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